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NOTE
PER CURIAM AFFIRMANCES WITHOUT OPINION: A
PROPER BASIS FOR CONFLICT JURISDICTION?
CHARLES E. BUKER III
Article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution grants the
supreme court jurisdiction to review any decision of a district court
of appeal that is in direct conflict with a decision of any other
district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question
of law. This type of jurisdiction is commonly referred to as conflict
jurisdiction.
For a period of time after the creation of the supreme court's
conflict jurisdiction per curiam affirmances (PCA's) without
opinion' were not considered reviewable absent exceptional
circumstances as they neither announce a point of law nor have
sufficient precedential value to raise the constitutionally required
direct conflict.' In 1965, however, the issue was reconsidered in
Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc.3 The court reversed its position and
held that PCA's without opinion have the same ability to raise
conflict as decisions with full opinions and were thus constitution-
ally reviewable where an examination of the "record proper" dis-
closed a conflict.' Notwithstanding the Foley decision, there has
been continued support for a categorical rule denying review of
PCA's without opinion. 5 The proponents of such a rule, however,
1. Because of the workload faced by Florida's appellate courts it is customary not to write
opinions where to do so would only serve to satisfy the parties that justice has been done,
thus adding needlessly to an already excessive volume of opinions. Accordingly, opinions are
generally dispensed with in cases which turn on facts to which established rules of law are
applicable or where a full or adequate opinion has been supplied by the trial judge. Foley v.
Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So. 2d 907, 908 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. dismissed,
177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965). A perhaps invalid assumption, but one which nevertheless under-
lies the review of PCA's without opinion, is that the district courts use PCA's to perpetrate
injustice which cannot be explained away in an opinion. Florida Greyhound Owners & Breed-
ers Ass'n v. West Flagler Assocs., 347 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring).
2. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958). "Exceptional circumstances" were found in
one case. The exceptional circumstance was that the decision under review included an
opinion while the decision it allegedly conflicted with was a PCA without opinion. Fidelity
Constr. Co. v. Arthur J. Collins & Son, Inc., 130 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1961).
3. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965). The court was sharply divided. Justice Roberts wrote the
opinion of the court with Justices Caldwell and Ervin concurring and Chief Justice Drew
concurring specially. Justice Thornal wrote a lengthy dissent in which Justices Thomas and
O'Connell concurred.
4. Id. at 225. For a complete discussion of the meaning of and problems created by the
court's use of the term "record proper" see Note, Conflict Certiorari Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Florida: The "Record Proper," 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 409 (1975).
5. See Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1970) (Thornal, J., dissenting). See
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have not since commanded a majority of the court.'This note will review the arguments supporting the continued
resistance to the Foley decision and will analyze whether the Florida
Constitution permits the supreme court to review PCA's without
opinion on conflict certiorari.
The constitutional article establishing the supreme court's con-
flict jurisdiction and creating the district courts of appeal was origi-
nally drafted by the Judicial Council of Florida.7 The Judicial Coun-
cil was created by the legislature in 1954 to meet the increasing
judicial demands of a rapidly growing state., The Council was
charged with the duty of studying Florida's entire judicial system
and recommending improvements. Its goal was to make the admin-
istration of justice more certain, more expedient, and less costly.!
The Council resolved to undertake a study of, among other things,
the appellate courts and the procedure necessary to relieve the se-
vere congestion in the supreme court which was one of the most
pressing problems of the day.'" At this early date the idea of courts
of appeal entirely separate from the supreme court was born.
In May of 1954 the Council and the committee of the Florida bar
on judicial administration met and together agreed that it would be
necessary to propose a complete revision of article V of the constitu-
tion. Under the Council's plan several district courts of' appeal
also Justice O'Connell's special concurring opinion in Home Dev. Co. v. Bursani, 178 So. 2d
113, 119 (Fla. 1965) in which he stated:
It has been and is my personal view that this Court does not have jurisdiction to
review, because of conflict, a decision of a district court of appeal which affirms a
judgment of a trial court per curiam without opinion. I have consistently voiced and
voted this view in the cases decided by this Court, relaxing it only to the point of
agreeing to request a district court to write an opinion where the circumstances
warranted. Now, however, a majority of this Court in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc.,
Fla. 1965, 168 So. 2d 749, have held that this Court does have jurisdiction to review
such a per curiam decision without opinion under the conditions detailed therein.
I am bound by this decision of a majority of this Court and compelled to follow it.
6. See, e.g., Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n v. West Flagler Assocs., 347 So.
2d 408 (Fla. 1977); Courtelis v. Lewis, 348 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1976); Williams v. State, 340 So.
2d 113 (Fla. 1976); Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585
(Fla. 1976); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1973); Escobar v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc., 247 So. 2d 311 (Fla.
1971); Home Dev. Co. v. Bursani, 178 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1965).
7. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1955).
8. Ch. 28062, 1953 Fla. Laws 216 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 43.15 (1977)).
9. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1954).
10. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1955). The supreme court had
more than 1200 cases in 1955, almost four times the national average. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF FLA., THIRD ANNUAL REPORT App., at 6, 7 (1956).
The Council also resolved to study a nonpartisan plan for the selection and tenure of
judges, the organization of and procedure in the trial courts, the most effective use of jurors
and other laymen, and improvement of administrative procedures within the judicial system.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA., FIRST ANNUAL REPoirT 11 (1954).
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would hear cases at various locations in the state, thereby decreas-
ing the supreme court's workload. Litigants would also receive the
benefit of greater accessibility since appeals would be heard closer
to their source. To avoid any possibility that the creation of these
courts would simply afford an additional appeal, the Council
thought it wise to clearly define and restrict the jurisdiction of the
supreme court and for that purpose drafted an amendment to article
V."I
A final draft of the proposed amendment to article V was pre-
pared and sent to the legislature.'2 Although amending the Council's
draft several times, the legislature retained untouched the sections
creating the district courts of appeal and defining the organization
and jurisdiction of the supreme court. '3 The amended proposal
passed almost unanimously in both houses of the legislature.'"
The proposed amendment was placed on the ballot of the general
election held on November 6, 1956. Not only did the amendment
receive the largest vote ever, but it also was adopted by the greatest
percentage ever given a constitutional amendment in the state's
history. 5
Soon after the ratification of the new amendment, the supreme
court rendered a series of unanimous decisions interpreting article
V and defining and circumscribing the supreme court's new conflict
jurisdiction.'6 In so doing, it echoed and embellished the expressed
objectives of the Judicial Council. The principles established by
those early decisions are central to resolving the question whether
11. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1955).
12. The final draft dealt with much more than just the creation of the district courts of
appeal and the restriction of the supreme court's jurisdiction. The proposed amendment
provided for (1) centralized administrative authority in the supreme court, (2) control of the
practice and procedure in all courts by the supreme court, (3) regulation of admissions to the
bar and discipline of attorneys by the supreme court, and (4) nonpartisan selection of su-
preme court justices, and district court and circuit court judges. Id. at 8.
13. Compare FLA. H.R. JOUR. 388 (Reg. Sess. 1955) with FLA. H.R. Jotn. 1162 (Reg. Sess.
1955) and FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1551 (Reg. Sess. 1955). For an excellent comparison between the
Judicial Council's recommendations and the amendment as finally passed, see JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF FLA., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT App. 1, at 1-31.
14. The vote on the final proposed amendment was 71 in favor, 0 against in the house; 33
in favor, 2 against in the senate. FLA. H.R. Jotm. 1551 (Reg. Sess. 1955); FLA. S. JOUR. 1054
(Reg. Sess. 1955).
It was the consensus of the Judicial Council that the changes made by the legislature did
not affect the council's general plan.
15. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 3, and at Exhibit 3 (1957).
16. South Fla. Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1960); Board of Comm'rs v.
Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1959); Karlin v. City of Miami Beach,
113 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1959); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1958);
Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958); Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1958);
Sinnamon v. Fowlkes, 101 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958); Diamond Berk Ins. Agency v. Goldstein,
100 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1958).
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per curiam affirmances without opinion are constitutionally review-
able under conflict jurisdicton and are recited below.
The supreme court was not granted its conflict jurisdiction in
order to provide petitioners a second appeal on the merits; the dis-
trict courts of appeal were clearly intended to have final rather than
intermediate appellate jurisdiction. 7 Rather, the purpose of this
grant of jurisdiction was to harmonize and stabilize the body of
decisional law in Florida by providing for review of decisions form-
ing patently irreconcilable precedents."'
In determining whether there exists the requisite direct conflict
among the decisions on the same point of law, the supreme court
should be concerned only with decisions as precedent not with the
adjudication of the rights of the particular litigants." It must appear
that the court of appeal has made a pronouncement on a point of
law which the bench and bar and future litigants may fairly regard
as an authoritative precedent. 0
The concern with precedential value follows not only from the
harmonizing purpose behind the supreme court's conflict jurisdic-
tion and the finality of the district courts' appellate jurisdiction, but
also from the construction of the language of article V itself. The
pertinent language, as originally adopted, read:
The supreme court may review by certiorari any decision of a dis-
trict court of appeal that affects a class of constitutional or state
officers, or that passes upon a question certified by the district
court of appeal to be of great public interest, or that is in direct
conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the
supreme court on the same point of law .... .
17. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
[Tihe powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were so defined and con-
fined that there would be no danger of the district courts of appeal becoming way
stations on the road to the Supreme Court.
They are and were meant to be courts of final appellate jurisdiction .... If they
are not considered and maintained as such the system will fail. Sustaining the
dignity of decisions of the district courts of appeal must depend largely on the
determination of the Supreme Court not to venture beyond the limitations of its
own powers by arrogating to itself the right to delve into a decision of a district court
of appeal primarily to decide whether or not the Supreme Court agrees with the
district court of appeal about the disposition of a given case.
Id. at 641-42 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
18. See South Fla. Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1960); N & L Auto Parts
Co. v. Doman, 117 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1960); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bell, 113 So. 2d 697
(Fla. 1959).
19. N & L Auto Parts Co. v. Doman, 117 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1960); Ansin v. Thurston,
101 So. 2d 808, 811 (Fla. 1958). The conflict must be real and embarrassing. Id. at 811. It
must be such that if the two decisions were rendered by the same court the latter would have
the effect of overruling the former. Kyle v. Kyle, 139 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. 1962).
20. South Fla. Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 1960).
21. Fla. CS for HJR 810 (1955), adopted in 1956 as FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2) (current
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The article embodies the idea of a supreme court which functions
as a supervisory body in the judicial system of the state, exercising
appellate power in certain specified areas essential to the settlement
of issues of public importance." Conflict jurisdiction is one of three
bases of certiorari jurisdiction found in the paragraph granting the
supreme court jurisdiction to review decisions of district courts of
appeal. All three deal with matters of public concern beyond the
interests of the immediate litigants.
A decision affecting all constitutional officers of like capacity
would generally be of great concern to the public. For example, a
decision relating to all superintendents of public instruction would
have a significant effect on the entire school system. Similarly, a
decision concerning all taxing officials would have a substantial
influence upon public finances.13 A decision certified to be of great
public interest is, of course, of public concern. Thus, the interpreta-
tion that the conflict jurisdiction be concerned with decisions as
precedent upon which the general public might authoritatively rely
as opposed to the rights of individual litigants is consistent with the
public character of the other bases of jurisdiction granted in that
sentence.
24
The constitutional grant of jurisdiction further requires that the
two decisions be in direct conflict on the same point of law. In the
early cases the term "decisions" was construed to mean both the
judgment and the opinion of the district court.25 This construction
is necessary because the primary question in determining jurisdic-
tion is whether the point or points of law announced by the district
court's decision under review are in direct conflict with points of law
announced by other district courts or by the supreme court. If there
is no point of law announced, there can be no conflict. The usual
method by which a district court announces a rule or point of law
is not by the judgment but by the opinion that accompanies the
judgment. It is in the opinion that the legal principles are expressed,
defined, and discussed. And it is from the opinions that the "case
law" is derived and relied upon as controlling precedent.2 6 The court
version at FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3)).
22. Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958). The article remains substantially
unchanged today. The word "any" was substituted for the word "another" in the phrase
"conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal .... ." to permit review of
conflicts occurring within a single district. Also the word "question" was substituted for the
word "point" in the phrase "point of law."
23. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958).
24. Id.
25. South Fla. Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1960); N & L Auto Parts Co.
v. Doman, 117 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1960); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356,
358 (Fla. 1958).
26. South Fla. Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 1960).
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delineated the following procedure to determine whether the requi-
site conflict exists: the court will examine the opinion upon which
the district court's decision is based, and if the opinion on its face
shows the probable existence of a direct conflict between the two
decisions on the same point of law, the writ of certiorari may issue .7
The court in Lake v. Lake, applying these principles, held that
review of PCA's without opinion was constitutionally prohibited
absent exceptional circumstances. 8 The Lake court reasoned that
the words "per curiam affirmed," without further elucidation or
elaboration, constituted a decision without an opinion that did not
announce to the public any principle of law."8 Since these words are
not a decision in the constitutional sense, and do not announce a
principle of law, they cannot be regarded as authoritative precedent
upon which future litigants may fairly rely. Neither can they pro-
vide the real and embarrassing conflict or confusion and dishar-
mony in the decisional law of the state necessary to invoke the
supreme court's jurisdiction.
The legal significance which attaches to the phrase "per curiam
affirmed" is merely the adjudication of the rights of particular liti-
gants in a particular case. As announced many times by the court,
the district courts of appeal are courts of final appellate jurisdiction,
especially in determining the rights of particular litigants. Unfor-
tunately, by suggesting that there might be exceptional cases where
a decision without opinion might be reviewed, the court in Lake left
the door open to the subsequent enlargement of its jurisdiction. : 1
The first case to come through the door was Rosenthal v. Scott.-
In Scott, a majority of the district court had reversed a circuit court
in a per curiam decision without opinion. :2 However, a concurring
opinion was found to contain adequate factual background for the
supreme court to entertain the petition for certiorari.*' In order to
resolve the jurisdictional issue, the court remanded the case to the
district court requesting that it adopt an opinion setting forth the
theory and reasoning in support of its reversal." This practice of
reviewing decisions without opinions by returning them to the dis-
27. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958).
28. 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
29. Id. at 643.
30. Note, The Erosion of Final Jurisdiction in Florida's District Courts of Appeal, 21 U.
FLA. L. REv. 375, 385 (1969).
31. 131 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1961).
32. Scott v. Rosenthal, 118 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
For purposes of conflict jurisdiction there was no opinion of the court. While it appears that
Judge Barns is writing for the court, a careful examination shows that neither of the other
judges agreed with his opinion but rather concurred in the judgment only. 131 So. 2d 481.
33. 131 So. 2d 481.
34. Id. at 482.
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trict courts to issue opinions continued until the decision in Foley.
Rose Foley and her husband brought an action against the manu-
facturer and retail seller of a bottle of reducing pills when the bottle
broke and lacerated Mrs. Foley's wrist. The action was founded on
negligence and breach of implied warranty. Defendant Weaver
Drugs successfully moved to strike the allegations relating to breach
of implied warranty and similarly obtained a summary judgment in
its favor on the negligence issue. The Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed without opinion .3 Certiorari was sought by the plaintiffs
solely on the implied warranty issue, and probable jurisdiction was
noted by the supreme court.
Because the Third District Court of Appeal had affirmed without
opinion, the supreme court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to
the district court requesting that it prepare an opinion setting forth
the theory and reasoning behind the decision.2 Justices Thomas
and Thornal dissented on the basis that the district court had not
yet written anything and hence had not yet expressed any view that
could conflict with another view of the law. :" The district court
refused to write an opinion, :8 and the supreme court, holding PCA's
without opinion reviewable where examination of the record proper
discloses a conflict, proceeded to review without the benefit of a
written opinion from either the trial court or the appellate court.:;'!
Ultimately, the supreme court affirmed the decision. "I
The supreme court's exercise of jurisdiction in Foley was based on
the premise that except for the slight difference in the review proce-
dure, a per curiam affirmance without opinion is both legally and
practically indistinguishable from a decision supported by an opin-
ion. The court, apparently confusing the verity of a PCA with the
precedential value accorded a PCA, impliedly reasoned that since
a decision without opinion should not be given any less verity than
a decision with an opinion, PCA's without opinion must have the
same precedential effect, and thus the same power to create confu-
sion and instability in the decisional law of the state, as decisions
supported by full opinions."
The initial flaw in this argument is that the verity of a decision
is not the same as the precedential value of that decision. Verity is
the quality of being true,"2 whereas precedent is an authoritative
35. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 146 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
36. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 168 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1964).
37. Id. at 751.
38. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
39. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
40. Id. at 229.
41. Id. at 224.
42. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2543 (16th ed. 1971).
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legal principle to be followed by future litigants. :' While a PCA is
neither any less correct nor any less truthful because it is rendered
without an opinion, it, nevertheless, announces no legal principle to
future litigants. Thus it has no precedential value and no ability to
cause the confusion and instability among the body of decisional
law necessary to invoke the supreme court's jurisdiction.
The court further attempted to support its position by stating
that in actual practice it had not been relieved of any substantial
portion of its workload by the policy of denying review of per curiam
decisions announced in Lake. "' The failure to achieve this objective
can be attributed to the Lake court's leaving open the possibility for
review in exceptional circumstances. In effect every unsuccessful
litigant in the district courts was invited to shout "exceptional cir-
cumstances"; which, of course, they did."' The bar's practice of
petitioning for review of PCA's without opinion was further invited
by the supreme court's procedure of noting probable jurisdiction in
PCA's without opinion and then temporarily relinquishing jurisdic-
tion to the district courts with a request that an opinion be written
explaining the theories and reasoning behind the decision.";
The answer to the problem of a burdensome workload is not for
the court to increase the scope of its jurisdiction. Rather, the ob-
vious answer, as suggested by Justice Drew in his special concurring
opinion, is for the court to adopt a rule or position that no PCA
without opinion would be subject to review on the theory of conflict
jurisdiction. 7 This would prevent litigants from incurring the ex-
pense of petitioning for certiorari in such cases and would relieve the
court of the burden of reviewing those petitions. This position would
be entirely consistent with the finality of the district courts' juris-
diction and the construction of the term "decision" as a judgment
and opinion.
If the supreme court in Foley were to actually ascribe to PCA's
without opinion the verity it suggests they deserve, the court would
presume the correctness of those decisions and refrain from assum-
ing jurisdiction where it is not constitutionally warranted. Instead,
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1968 (4th ed. 1951).
44. 177 So. 2d at 223.
45. See Justice England's concurring opinion in Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders
Ass'n v. West Flagler Assocs., 347 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977).
46. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, 168 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1964); Fontainebleau Hotel
Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 168 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1964); Home Dev. Co. v. Bursani,
168 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1964); accord, State v. Leveson, 147 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1962); Rosenthal v.
Scott, 131 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1961) (per curiam reversals without opinion sent back to district
courts); cf. Solomon v. Sanitarians' Registration Bd., 147 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1962) (decision with
opinion remanded for clarification because no opinion concurred in by a majority of the
court).
47. 177 So. 2d at 229.
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fearing that a district court of appeal will perpetuate a facially
undiscoverable injustice, the court arrogates to itself the power to
prevent any possibility of this unlikely occurrence.'
In his special concurring opinion Justice Drew viewed the central
question to be whether a PCA without opinion constitutes a decision
in the constitutional sense. He stated that in the absence of some-
thing in the record indicating a contrary view one must assume that
an affirmance of a decision of a trial court by a decision of the
district court of appeal transforms the trial court's decision into the
decision of the district court of appeal. Therefore, as far as the bench
and bar who are familiar with the trial judge's decision are con-
cerned, such decision is the law of that jurisdiction.-"
Presumably inherent in this logic is the further idea that a PCA
without opinion is a decision in the constitutional sense and is
therefore reviewable. While Justice Drew failed to define what he
meant by the phrase "decision in the constitutional sense," he was
apparently attempting to show that a per curiam decision without
opinion stood for a principle of law, no matter how invisible or un-
discernible to the public, which could be relied upon as authorita-
tive in that jurisdiction, at least by the few who were exposed to its
application and aware of its existence. However, one can easily
rebut this theory by simply pointing out that decisions without
opinion, even those with some admitted precedential value, merely
adjudicate the rights of particular litigants and do not affect a sig-
nificant enough number of people to create a real and embarrassing
conflict in the body of decisional law of the state.
Seemingly Justice Drew's greatest concern was that chaos would
result within the state judicial sytem if PCA's without opinion were
not reviewable. He feared that inconsistency and disharmony of the
law among the districts might prevail. 5 One must again ask, how-
ever, whether PCA's are really a large enough factor in the deci-
sional law of the state to have a disruptive effect. Could the supreme
court ever really lose control over the uniformity of the decisional
law of the state by restricting the scope of its conflict jurisdiction
to decisions with opinions? The possibility seems quite remote and
the resultant harm from such a possibility, as evidenced by the
functioning of the federal court system, appears to be minimal.
48. Justice Roberts points out that an affirmance without opinion is generally deemed to
be an approval of the judgment of the trial court and becomes a precedent in the trial court
rendering the judgment. 177 So. 2d at 225-26. Nevertheless, this could hardly create the real
and embarrassing conflict in the jurisprudence of the state necessary to constitutionally
warrant the supreme court's attention. See Justice England's concurring opinion in Florida
Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n v. West Flagler Assocs., 347 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977).
49. 177 So. 2d at 230.
50. Id.
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Even if the possibility were substantial, the proper question is not
to what extent the supreme court should restrict its own jurisdic-
tion, but to what extent the constitution does restrict the supreme
court's jurisdiction.
Agreeing completely that the district courts of appeal were in-
tended to and must be courts of final appellate jurisdiction, Justice
Drew attempted to show that the appellate jurisdiction of those
courts has in fact been final.' He noted that through 1964 almost
ninety-nine out of one hundred cases filed in the district courts of
appeal had not been disturbed by the supreme court; consequently,
he argued the jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal obviously
must be final.5 2
Justice Drew's argument again misses the mark. The purpose of
the constitutional amendment was not that the decisions of the
district courts of appeal remain undisturbed, but that the jurisdic-
tion of the district courts of appeal be final so as to eliminate the
additional cost of a second appeal. These two purposes are not the
same. While the decison was disturbed in slightly more than one out
of one hundred of the cases filed in the district courts of appeal
through 1964, the jurisdiction was not final in more than one out of
twenty-five of those cases.53
Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the litigants' pocketbook, ju-
risdiction was not final in almost one out of seven cases filed in the
district courts.54 In those cases the litigants went to the additional
expense of filing petitions for certiorari which at that time required
preparing argument on the merits. In terms of the litigants' expense
in time and money, in those one out of seven cases filed, final appel-
late jurisdiction effectively vested in the supreme court rather than
in the district courts of appeal.
One must also remember that the statistics presented in Justice
Drew's concurring opinion covered a period when PCA's without
opinion were generally considered not reviewable. The impact of the
Foley decision could only increase the number of petitions for cer-
tiorari review of PCA's without opinion. 55
51. Id. at 230-31.
52. Id. at 231.
53. Through 1964, 14,444 cases were filed in the three district courts of appeal and 2,005
petitions for certiorari were filed in the supreme court to review those decisions. Only 180 were
changed or altered. Id. at 230. Thirty percent of the 2,005 petitions were granted, resulting
in the review of approximately 600 of the 14,444 district court cases-or 1 out of 25. 30% x
2,005 1.0420 = 4.16% = ; this figure takes into account the loss of final appellate jurisdiction
14,444 25
by the district courts only as a result of certiorari jurisdiction in the supreme court. It does
not account for appeals from the district courts as a matter of right.





In dissent, Justice Thornal reminded the reader that the power
to review PCA's without opinion must be found within the constitu-
tion, and argued that the one word "affirmed" cannot provide the
constitutionally required direct conflict among decisions. He
pointed out that by allowing the court to explore the trial record in
order to find conflict, the majority holds that the court has the
power to create conflict where it previously did not exist.2"
Justice Thornal further argued that the majority's decision meant
that district court decisions are no longer final under any circum-
stances, and that the majority had invited every unsuccessful liti-
gant in the district court to come up to the supreme court and be
granted a second appeal. He noted that this was the very thing
which we assured the people of this state would not happen when
the judiciary article was amended in 1956. . . . If I were a practic-
ing lawyer in Florida, I would never again accept with finality a
decision of a District Court." 5
Since the Foley decision, there has been continued resistance to
the review of PCA's without opinion and to the expansion of the
supreme court's jurisdiction through its practice of looking into the
"record proper" to determine conflict jurisdiction." Notwithstand-
ing this resistance, the supreme court has continued to expand its
jurisdiction to the point of severely distorting the finality of the
district courts' appellate jurisdiction. 9 As a justification for the ex-
pansion of its jurisdiction, the court has often pointed to the neces-
sity of maintaining uniformity in the law while overlooking the con-
stitutional mandate that the jurisdiction of the district courts is
final. °0
In the past several years, this resistance to the review of PCA's
without opinion and to the erosion of the finality of the district
courts' jurisdiction has suddenly become highly visible. Since his
election to the court, Chief Justice England has written a number
of opinions recognizing the jurisdictional principles early estab-
lished by the court, pointing out the court's deviation from these
established constitutional principles and vociferously calling for the
55. While this information is not available, we do know that in 1978 there were 1,366
petitions for certiorari filed in the supreme court from the district courts alone and that more
than 30% of the 9,692 district court decisions were rendered without opinion. OFFICE OF THE
STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, FLA. JUDICIAL SYSTEM STATISTICAL REPORT 34, 39 (1978).
56. 177 So. 2d at 234.
57. Id. (emphasis in original).
58. See Justice Thornal's vigorous dissent in Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970)
and the dissents of Justices Thornal and O'Connell in Home Dev. Co. v. Bursani, 178 So. 2d
113 (Fla. 1965).
59. See, e.g., Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967).
60. See The Erosion of Final Jurisdiction in Florida's District Courts of Appeal, supra
note 30, at 388.
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dethronement of the Foley decision. While most of the other mem-
bers of the court have concurred in England's opinions at one time
or another, in no decision has a majority of the court concurred in
any opinion explicitly calling for the overruling of Foley."
In Williams v. State,6 2 the court was again faced with review of a
PCA without opinion. Justice England, joined by Justices Hatchett
and Overton, recognized the finality of the district court's appellate
jurisdiction and the limited precedential value of per curiam deci-
sions without opinion. Voting to deny review, they wrote: "One
appeal to review the fairness of a trial is all that is appropriate in a
state with intermediate appellate courts. Where our court has no
law-harmonizing or precedent-developing function, our intercession
for a second full plenary review merely erodes the constitutional
finality of our district courts. '6 3
The question whether a PCA without opinion has sufficient prece-
dential value to cause the constitutionally required direct conflict,
the issue upon which the Foley decision turned, was most vigorously
addressed in Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Association v.
West Flagler Associates.4 There, a petition for writ of certiorari to
review a PCA without opinion was unanimously and summarily
dismissed. Justice England wrote a concurring opinion in which he
analyzed in depth the supreme court's review of per curiam deci-
sions without opinions and the pivotal question of whether these
decisions can ever create the degree of decisional conflict required
by the constitution.
In my view, the premise articulated by the Foley majority is in
all events manifestly unsound. . . .The high cost of Foley in dol-
lars and time to litigants and to the judiciary of Florida now de-
mands that the majority decision there be reconsidered. . . .To
my mind, there is no possible way that a district court's affirmance
without opinion can create decisional disharmony in the jurisprud-
ence of this state sufficient to warrant our attention.65
The majority opinion in Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington,'"
although not explicitly calling for the abandonment of Foley, would
appear to require that Foley be overruled. At a pretrial hearing, the
circuit court in a written opinion denied Mystan Marine's motion
to tax costs. Mystan Marine petitioned for common law certiorari
61. See, e.g., cases cited note 6 supra.
62. 340 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976).
63. Id. at 116 (dissenting opinion).
64. 347 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977).
65. Id. at 410-11 (emphasis added).
66. 339 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1976).
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to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, but its petition was summar-
ily denied. The district court's entire opinion consisted of the two
words "certiorari denied."6
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice England, the su-
preme court denied review, recognizing that the district courts of
appeal have final appellate jurisdiction to review the rights of par-
ticular litigants, that the supreme court has a narrow and excep-
tional conflict jurisdiction to review only decisions having preceden-
tial value, and that decisions without accompanying statements of
reason have insufficient precedential value to constitutionally war-
rant a second review. The opinion of the court, joined in by Chief
Justice Overton and Justices Adkins, Boyd and Sundberg, stated:
It is clear, then, that Mystan Marine was denied a financial benefit
by the circuit court which a defendant in the identical legal posi-
tion in Royal Globe [the decision that Mystan Marine allegedly
conflicted with] was able to obtain. That does not alone show,
however, that the decisions of the two district courts are in direct
conflict for purposes of our jurisdiction.
...Article V uses the words "direct conflict" to manifest a
"concern with decisions as precedents as opposed to adjudications
of the rights of particular litigants."
In this perspective, it is seen that the decision of the district
court we are now asked to review does not constitute precedent in
any form. Its entire opinion consists of the words "certiorari de-
nied," and there is no means by which we, or anyone else, can
determine exactly what action the district court took.
Obviously the denial of certiorari by a district court without a
statement of reasons does not create discord in the decisional law
of this state. Since its decision lacks precedential value, the consti-
tutional scope of our jurisdiction prohibits our review.66
The Mystan Marine court, on materially stronger facts, reached
a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Foley court. In both
Foley and Mystan Marine a pretrial motion was ruled on at a hear-
ing. 9 The lower court in Foley, however, ruled orally on the motion
and did not write an opinion, making it almost impossible for any-
one to positively ascertain the basis upon which the judge ruled.7'
The respective district courts, without opinion or explanation, re-
fused to upset the trial judges' rulings. The supreme court in Foley
67. Id. at 201.
68. 339 So. 2d at 201-02 (emphasis added) (quoting Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808,
811 (Fla. 1958)).
69. Id. at 201; Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
70. 177 So. 2d at 221.
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held that PCA's without opinion are reviewable as a general rule
while in Mystan Marine, without mentioning Foley, it held that
certiorari denials without opinions, the functional equivalent of
PCA's for purposes of conflict jurisdiction, are not reviewable as a
general rule.
Some contend that PCA's and certiorari denials without opinion
are distinguishable because in a certiorari denial it cannot be deter-
mined whether review was denied on the basis of the merits or on
the court's exercise of its plenary discretion to deny review. The
asserted distinction is not material. The Mystan Marine court states
that because the entire district court opinion consists of the two
words "certiorari denied" there is no means by which the basis of
the district court's action can be exactly determined. Assuming this
is true, it is equally true that the three words "per curiam affirmed"
cannot provide the exact basis of a district court's action. The three
words remove only one of a large number of possible bases upon
which a district court might rule; the procedural exercise of the
court's plenary discretion to deny review. The three words, however,
still do not tell us upon which of the remaining possible procedural
and substantive bases the court's decision was based. Thus, PCA's
without opinion should be no more reviewable than certiorari deni-
als without opinion.
The provisions of article V establishing the supreme court's con-
flict jurisdiction and creating the district courts of appeal were pri-
marily a response to the overwhelming caseload in the supreme
court. The obvious purpose of this article was effected by creating
the district courts of appeal and transferring to them a substantial
portion of the supreme court's former responsibilities. This transfer
of responsibilities included a transfer of final appellate jurisdiction,
leaving the supreme court mainly supervisory duties.
As a response to the need to fine tune the newly created appellate
system, rather than as a response to any major judicial problem, the
supreme court was given a very limited and restricted jurisdiction
by which it might maintain within certain bounds the general sta-
bility and uniformity in the law of the state as announced by the
district courts. Thus, the purpose of the supreme court's conflict
jurisdiction-to prevent disharmony and instability among prece-
dents-should be viewed as secondary to the primary objective of
reducing the caseload of the supreme court.
In an attempt to prevent any possibility of a perpetration of a
facially undiscoverable injustice by the district courts of appeal, the
court in Foley subordinated the finality of the district courts' appel-
late jurisdiction to the supreme court's conflict jurisdiction. While
this was an indisputably well-intended action, it was nevertheless
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a very apparent and unconstitutional usurpation of the district
courts' appellate jurisdiction, resulting ultimately in more injustice
than justice.
In 1955 the supreme court handled more than 1,200 cases. The
resultant overload necessitated a severe restriction of the court's
jurisdiction through the adoption of article V. Initially under this
scheme PCA's without opinion were considered unreviewable. The
court has since reversed its position on PCA's and has increased its
review powers to the point that in 1978 the court handled more than
2,700 cases resulting in a backlog of more than 1,300 cases.7' A
constitutional amendment redefining and limiting the court's juris-
diction has again been recommended. 71 Can it ever become more
apparent that the time to overrule Foley has arrived?
71. OFFICE OF THE STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, FLA. JUDICIAL SYSTEM STATISTICAL REPORT
34 (1978).
72. Fla. Bar News, Apr. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
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